Jez Littlewood on Bill C-59 and what it means for Canada’s national security

The recently introduced Bill C-59 described by experts as the biggest overhaul in Canadian national security since the creation of the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS) in 1984, enacts the establishment of a so-called super watchdog agency – the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency – to keep an eye on federal departments and agencies gathering intelligence, as well as revamps the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) and its activities, among other provisions. Katarina Koleva talked to Jez Littlewood, an Assistant Professor at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, who teaches courses on terrorism, national security, intelligence, and arms control, about his thoughts on Bill C-59, the changes it introduces, and what they mean for Canada’s security.

iAffairs: What exactly is Bill C-59 going to change?

Jez Littlewood: The Bill is going to change a lot of things. It is omnibus legislation. It changes a number of existing acts of legislation such as the CSIS’s Act, the National Defence Act, it changes parts of what was the antiterrorism act in 2015 – Bill C 51. In that sense, it changes a lot in terms of accountability structures but equally, in reality, it is tweaking and refining some of the major issues that were clearly points of concern among parliamentarians as well as among the public in Bill C-51 rather than rejecting them and getting rid of them in their entirety.

iAffairs: In what way does Bill C-59 address and refine some of the concerns raised by Bill C-51?

Jez Littlewood: It tries to do this in two ways. The first is to refine or amend some definitional terms in certain areas. To give two examples in that sense. First, major concerns were raised about the idea that CSIS could take part in what are considered to be disruption activities. This makes CSIS, rather than a passive gatherer of intelligence that was passed on to other people, if there was a threat to the security of Canada, more actively involved in disrupting those threats. C-51 allowed or certainly permitted that those disruption activities could be potentially very far ranging, to the point that it allowed breaches of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, in certain circumstances, if a federal judge approved a warrant for such activities in contravention of the Charter. In one sense, a major concern was that we were allowing our intelligence agency to essentially violate certain portions of the Charter, under federal warrant, but that warrant itself will be delivered in secret. Bill C-59 rolls that back by essentially making it clear that there are certain disruption activities which do not require a warrant even though these are not specified in the Act. Listed in the Act in seven broad categories of disruption where a warrant would be required. These are the areas of potential concern.  Equally, it is clear that C-59 passes what the lawyers would call the Section One Charter test, which means it is supposed to be within the infringement of civil liberties and rights the Charter permits for national security reasons. That is one area.

Another area relates to disclosure of information and what was the Information Sharing Act. The concerns in the Bill C-51, in that context, was that 17 agencies and departments in Canada were named in the act itself as being able to share information, if perceived to be necessary to assist in the security of Canada. That, “security of Canada,” was a very broad definition. This has been narrowed somewhat, in an attempt to clarify that we are not talking about new intelligence collection, and that such sharing of information can only happen if it really does assist in national security investigation. So, there is some tweaking of the definitions in C-51 and refinements to certain portions of it rather than a wholesale rolling back.

iAffairs: What would be the mandate and the structure of the new super watchdog agency and how would it fit within the existing bodies of ministerial, judicial, and independent oversight?

Jez Littlewood: Essentially, the new agency deals with a problem that we’ve long had in existence in Canada. At this stage, the intelligence accountability is based upon review bodies that are sort of agency or department specific. For example CSIS had the Security Intelligence Review Committee and it could only look at CSIS; CSE has the Office of the CSE Commissioner; the RCMP has the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission. The barriers between these review bodies, the silos, have been quite firm, not impossible to bridge, but nonetheless still quite firm. This new review agency – the National Security Intelligence Review Agency – is going to subsume and take over certainly SIRC and the CSE Commissioner’s office. It will take some responsibilities for the national security component of the RCMPS’s review body in a way that allows review and accountability agencies to follow the thread of the investigations, as people say, rather than be siloed. We are likely to see, assuming C-59 passes in due course, a fundamental restructuring of Canadian intelligence and accountability oversight issues. This is, of course, in conjunction with two other areas. The first is the establishment of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians which gives parliamentarians a role here, which is separate to what is in C-59. But equally we would see in C-59 itself the creation of an Intelligence Commissioner who will handle some of the ministerial authorizations so that the instructions and permissions from the ministers to CSE, within its foreign intelligence and cyber role, and within CSIS related to the retention of its open source datasets.

iAffairs: How would the new review Agency and the Parliamentarian Committee complement each other?

Jez Littlewood: They are separate or will be separate in law. But certainly within the first drafting of C-59 it is clear that the new review agency will work with parliamentarians, if they decide or they have a common interest. They can certainly share or would be expected to share information where it is possible to do so. So, we should see these bodies as separate but nevertheless complementary. I certainly don’t detect in the way the legislation is written that these are competing rather than complementary, in different levels. There is a level of interest and focus within parliamentarians and a different level of experts working inside and along with an agency, department, or entity which is doing intelligence. In reality, the latter is not what you would expect parliamentarians to be doing anyway. But the overlap exists and Parliamentarians have a quite wide latitude on paper to go where they see fit.

iAffairs: Do you see any weaknesses in the text of Bill C-59?

Jez Littlewood: There are a number of issues which have to be thought about, in some detail, and presumably discussed quite robustly in parliamentary committees. It is clear that some organizations remain concerned about the level of information sharing. The information sharing components of C-51 have now been renamed the information disclosure components of C-59. There are also some issues in terms of the tweaking of the passenger protect program, i.e. the no fly list, which remains a concern for some civil liberties organizations. So I would certainly expect the government is going to be pushed quite hard in consultations, and don’t necessarily think we should expect this to be simple or easy ride, in terms of the passage of Bill C-59 in due course.

iAffairs: When is the bill likely to become law? How long will the process take?

Jez Littlewood: I would imagine it will take at least one year. There is an expectation that there will be further delay. So, even if we allow for parliamentary committees to be up and running, and considering this in October, it is a wide ranging bill, with a lot of moving parts. If it is going to be reviewed correctly, that is going to take, in my view, at least six to eight months of committee hearings, and back and forth. I would be surprised if C-59 is law by this time next year, in 2018. At the same time, I would be somewhat disappointed given the fact that I am broadly in favor of what is in C-59. There are some things that might need attention but I will be somewhat disappointed if it wasn’t finally tweaked and becomes acceptable by the end of 2018.

iAffairs: The document permits CSE to hack foreign nations. Is it aimed to shut down potential cyber-attacks?

Jez Littlewood: The CSE already has foreign and signal intelligence, as well as cyber safety and cyber assurance role. It is in its existing mandate, as well as offering technical advice to existing law enforcement intelligence agencies. It is really putting armour or proposing to put on a legal footing the fact that CSE can have more interventionist role, more active or offensive role. But equally it can have an active defensive role in thwarting attacks and interfering with the structures in the cyber domain. At this early stage, we understand, these will not be decisions taken solely by the CSE internally. Such decisions would have to involve ministerial authorizations and oversight of a fairly high level of government. So, it alters CSE mandate pretty much in line with what people have been thinking is going to be necessary in the future years, and puts more extensive and intrusive technical capabilities in the hands of government on a much more formal legal foundation.

iAffairs: Are there models of super watchdog agencies, in other countries, that Canada can draw examples from?

Jez Littlewood: The one, in some sense of a model, might be Australia which has the Inspector General approach which looks across all of Australia’s national security and intelligence community. In some respects we can look at that. In another way, in a separate environment, we can look at the UK’s Independent Commissioner to deal with counterterrorism issues which is focused on counterterrorism, not the broader set of national security. Canada’s approach is to cover all aspects of national security.

iAffairs: What are your thoughts with regard to the latest terrorist attacks in London and elsewhere – using vehicles as weapons?

Jez Littlewood: It is not a new terror tactic in the sense that we’ve seen vehicles used as weapons in Nice, France, in Germany, in Sweden, and elsewhere. However, it has been an innovation over the last decade or so, a part of a broader trend with two characteristics. The first is coming exclusively from the so-called Islamic State for individuals to basically carry out acts of terror wherever and however they can. Even if you do not have access to bombs or weapons, you use what you have and this is what we see in the propaganda, as well as in the literature – use a vehicle, use a knife. A good example, of course, being October 2014, and the attack in Quebec. The other part of that trend is that counterterrorism efforts have made it more difficult, but not impossible, for individuals to get quite sophisticated weapons. So, in one sense the success of counterterrorism in largely removing bomb making capabilities has pushed terrorists into using bladed weapons, vehicles etc. This trend reinforces what we’ve known for a long time throughout the history of terrorism – terrorism and counterterrorism have action-reaction effect on each other. If some things become harder or more difficult for terrorists, they shift to different kinds of targeting tactics. This, unfortunately, is one of those realities we are all living in.

In terms of prevention, are we going to harden every bridge, every sidewalk? That is unlikely. That is not really going to happen. Some measures might be temporary, in terms of, for example, if you have a special event where the street is closed off for a public celebration. The streets around it, you may have a much more controlled access to a given area. There are some practical short term measures that can be taken. But the reality is it is very difficult for any intelligence agency or police force to prevent an individual who may simply get in his own car and decide to target civilians. It is an unfortunate reality. We have to accept that we can do some things but we cannot eliminate all risks in their entirety.

This article is a cross-post from iAffairs.

Doing More, Better: Reflections on the Future of Canadian Assistance to Haiti

By Gaëlle Rivard Piché

Ready for change. That was the Liberal Party’s main slogan during the Canadian electoral campaign that brought Justin Trudeau into power on October 19. It is also the state of Canada-Haiti relations after four years of sullenness due to a decline in Canadian funding for Haiti’s reconstruction and successive diplomatic faux pas.

After a decade of Conservative reign driven by hard-line security imperatives and a development strategy resolutely based on economic priorities, a new Liberal government suggests a change in Canadian foreign policy. Considering Trudeau’s commitment to restore Canada’s image abroad, what will be the Canadian role in the next chapter of Haiti’s development?

In 2004, Paul Martin’s Liberal government agreed to participate in a multilateral effort towards Haiti’s stabilization and reconstruction. Under the following Conservative governments, Haiti officially remained a priority, but a shift in the rationale for aid put a stop to several bilateral programs, including quick impact projects funded by the Department of Foreign Affaires and International Trade’s Stabilisation and Reconstruction Task Force. The reduction of the budget envelope had a direct impact on the ability of the Canadian embassy to engage with its Haitian counterparts. The lack of a clear strategy after the end of the earthquake recovery phase in 2012 also marginalized the role and the importance of Canada at the donors’ table. Canada still remains a key contributor to the MINUSTAH, the UN peace operation deployed since 2004, but the foreseen end of the mission after 2016 raises serious concerns about the future of international assistance.

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Public Opinion and Interventions Abroad

By Jean-Christophe Boucher and Kim Richard Nossal

Does public opinion influence Canadian decisions on interventions abroad? Do policy-makers pay attention to what ordinary Canadians think when they decide whether to commit the Canadian Armed Forces to overseas missions?

Two recent interventions—Canada’s long mission in Afghanistan and the current operation against the forces of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as ISIS, Islamic State in Iraq and al-Shām)—provide an excellent opportunity to test the impact of the Canadian public on issues of war and peace.

In the case of Afghanistan, as we show in our chapter in Canada Among Nations 2015, public opinion was generally strongly opposed to the Canadian mission, but policy-makers in Ottawa largely ignored the opposition being expressed by the public: they refused to bring the troops home, and indeed maintained the mission until 2014, when much of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces were leaving. Indeed, the governing Conservatives and the opposition Liberals conspired with one another to take the Afghanistan mission off the domestic political agenda.

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L’opinion publique et les interventions à l’étranger

par Jean-Christophe Boucher et Kim Richard Nossal

L’opinion publique influence-t-elle les décisions canadiennes relatives aux interventions à l’étranger? Les décideurs politiques prêtent-ils attention à ce que pensent les Canadiens ordinaires en décidant s’ils devraient engager les Forces armées canadiennes dans des missions à l’étranger?

Deux interventions récentes, la longue mission canadienne en Afghanistan et l’opération actuelle contre les forces de l’État islamique en Irak et au Levant (l’EIIL, connu aussi sous le nom de l’État Islamique d’Irak et d’al-Sham, EIIS) fournissent une excellente occasion de vérifier l’impact du public canadien sur les questions de guerre et de paix.

Dans le cas de l’Afghanistan, comme nous le montrons dans notre chapitre dans Canada Among Nations 2015, l’opinion publique était généralement fortement opposée à la mission canadienne, mais les décideurs d’Ottawa ont largement ignoré l’opposition exprimée par le public : ils ont refusé de rapatrier les troupes et ont même maintenu la mission jusqu’en 2014, alors qu’une bonne partie des forces de l’Organisation du Traité de l’Atlantique Nord partaient. En effet, les conservateurs au pouvoir ont conspiré avec les libéraux de l’opposition pour enlever la mission en Afghanistan du programme politique intérieur.

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A Backwards Decade on Foreign Aid: How Commercial Gain Came to Replace Poverty Reduction as the Primary Goal of Canadian Foreign Aid.

By Stephen Brown

A decade of Conservative rule has had a profound impact on Canadian foreign aid — and mostly for the worst.

With respect to aid level, we are back where we started. The Harper government initially embraced the Liberals’ goal of doubling aid. However, having reached it, they froze and then cut aid spending. When measured as a percentage of gross national income, foreign aid is now lower than when they came to power — and barely a third of the target to which Canada committed in 1970.

For a while, security interests seemed dominant. Afghanistan became the largest Canadian aid recipient ever. Under a new “whole-of-government approach,” the government increasingly linked aid with other elements of foreign policy, including diplomacy and especially defence. The result was disappointing on all levels. An internal government evaluation recognized that an overemphasis on short-term goals undermined the achievement and sustainability of long-term results. For instance, after Canada withdrew its troops from Kandahar, it left its much-touted Dahla Dam “signature project” for the Americans to complete, but the latter had other priorities.

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Comment les gains commerciaux sont venus remplacer la réduction de la pauvreté comme objectif principal de l’aide étrangère canadienne

par Stephen Brown

Une décennie de règne conservateur a eu un impact profond, et principalement négatif, sur l’aide étrangère canadienne.

En ce qui concerne le niveau de l’aide, nous sommes de retour à la case départ. Au début, le gouvernement Harper a adopté le but des libéraux de doubler l’aide. Cependant, ayant atteint ce but, les conservateurs ont gelé, et puis réduit les dépenses liées à l’aide. En tant que pourcentage du revenu national brut, l’aide étrangère est actuellement inférieure à son niveau du début du règne conservateur- et à peine un tiers de la cible à laquelle le Canada s’est engagé en 1970.

Pendant un certain temps, des considérations relatives à la sécurité ont semblé dominer. L’Afghanistan est devenu le plus grand bénéficiaire de l’aide canadienne de l’histoire. Suivant une nouvelle approche «pangouvernementale,» le gouvernement a de plus en plus lié l’aide à d’autres éléments de la politique étrangère, dont la diplomatie et surtout la défense. Le résultat a été décevant sur tous les plans. Selon une évaluation gouvernementale interne, une insistance démesurée sur des buts à court terme minait la réalisation et la durabilité de résultats à long terme. Par exemple, après le retrait de ses troupes, le Canada a laissé aux Américains le soin d’achever son fameux «projet de premier plan,» le barrage Dahla. Ces derniers, cependant, avaient d’autres priorités.

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Living among the Population in Southern Afghanistan: A Canadian Approach to Counter-Insurgency

By Caroline Leprince

The Munk Debate on Canada’s Foreign Policy brought together last September the three federal party leaders to defend their foreign policy visions for the country. The first question of the debate was on Canada’s military involvement in fighting the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). This highlights the importance of the role Canada has to play internationally to stop threats to international peace and security. As the world appears to be becoming a more dangerous place with ideological extremism spreading throughout the poorest regions of the globe, Canada must be ready to operate in these complex environments as future conflicts are likely to occur within weak and fragile states.

To do so, the hard-won lessons learned during the Canadian intervention in Afghanistan can help better prepare Canada for the challenges of the twenty-first century. The chapter “Living among the Population in Southern Afghanistan: A Canadian Approach to Counter-insurgency” captures first-hand experiences of the counter-insurgency tactics used by the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) during its engagement in Kandahar Province from 2005 to 2011. During the first years of the intervention, the hard fought battles to maintain ground proved unable to tackle the insurgency. The influx of additional American troops to Kandahar in 2009 was the turning point that gave the Canadian-led Task Force Kandahar (TFK) the means to realize its ambitions. It created an unprecedented opportunity to adopt a new counterinsurgency strategy centred on the protection of the population. First introduced in the village of Deh-e-Bag in June 2009, the implementation of the key village approach rapidly demonstrated its capacity to address the root causes of the insurgency. With the American surge that arrived in Spring 2010, the key village approach expanded and was used to plan stability operations in the villages of Dand and Panjwayi districts.

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Vivre parmi la population du sud de l’Afghanistan : une approche canadienne en matière de contre-insurrection

par Caroline Leprince

 Le débat Munk sur la politique étrangère du Canada a réuni au mois de septembre dernier les trois chefs de partis fédéraux pour défendre leurs visions de la politique étrangère du pays. La première question du débat portait sur l’engagement militaire du Canada dans le combat contre l’État islamique en Irak et en Syrie (EIIS). Cela souligne l’importance du rôle que le Canada doit jouer au niveau international pour contrer les menaces pour la paix et la sécurité internationales. À mesure que le monde paraît devenir de plus en plus dangereux, l’extrémisme idéologique se propageant dans les régions les plus pauvres de la planète, le Canada doit être prêt à opérer dans ces environnements complexes, puisque les conflits futurs vont probablement se produire dans des États faibles et fragiles.

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Lancement du livre Canada Among Nations 2015: Elusive Pursuits

par Steve Saideman

Dans une semaine, le 29 octobre à midi, nous lancerons la prochaine édition de Canada Among Nations, Elusive Pursuits, Lessons from Canada’s Interventions Abroad. Le lancement aura lieu dans la salle 270, 2e étage, Residence Commons, à l’Université Carleton.

Quel est le sujet du livre? Chaque année, NPSIA évalue la place du Canada dans le monde dans un volume de Canada Among Nations. Depuis quelques années, cela se fait en partenariat avec le CIGI (Centre for International Governance Innovation). Cette édition a comme thème les leçons à tirer des interventions passées. Pourquoi? Parce que nous avons été profondément frustrés par les résultats mitigés et le refus du gouvernement de tirer des leçons.

L’Afghanistan devait être différent, le gouvernement ayant créé un exercice sérieux sur les leçons à tirer. Mais à la fin, celui-ci a été enterré. Non seulement j’ai été incapable d’y accéder via l’Accès à l’information (ma demande date déjà de plus de deux ans), mais aussi celui-ci n’a pas été disséminé à ceux qui élaborent et mettent en œuvre la politique étrangère et de défense du pays.

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The Health of Our Global Community: Canada’s Responsibility at Home and Abroad

By Sarah Kennell

Health is prominently featured in the Sustainable Development Goals – and rightly so. It affects us all. From developing strategies that address the Ebola crisis to ensuring healthcare systems meet the needs of all people, health is a human right and central to positive economic, social and environmental outcomes.

Goal 3: Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages includes a cross-cutting set of targets on maternal mortality, HIV/AIDS, sexual and reproductive health, and environmental impacts. Health is also integrated as a target across a number of goals, including those related to gender, the environment, poverty and consumption – implicitly recognizing the interlinkages necessary to health. Such an approach signals a shift from how development was conceived in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (three separate goals), toward the new integrated development framework of the SDGs, which aspires to be grounded in a human rights-based approach.

One area where such a shift is clear in the SDGs is around sexual and reproductive health – and the Government of Canada with its focus on Maternal, Newborn and Child Health, can play a leadership role on this, at home and abroad.

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