Dismounting the Moral High-horse: Nuancing Canada’s Perceived “altruistic” Approach to Immigration

Canada is a leader in welcoming refugees. Claims that the government holds an altruistic stance on immigration have become part of the collective national consciousness. What is especially surprising is the belief, regardless of political affiliation, that Canadian immigration is a form of charity to newcomers that allows them to start a new life. Whether it be praise for Trudeau’s acceptance of Syrian migrants or criticism of his overly generous refugee acceptance at taxpayers’ expense, many Canadians perceive their country as generous with regards to immigration policy. Although this perceived altruism may appear as a fundamental international responsibility to some, or a misguided charitable policy that holds a high economic cost to others, the notion that immigration policy is not in Canada’s own self-interest is fundamentally wide off the mark. There may be a charitable portion to immigration by accepting refugees (both government funded and privately sponsored) fleeing danger and seeking asylum, but the majority of immigration remains principally economically motivated.

Put bluntly, the question is whether Canada’s policy is really based on welcoming those in need, or not. Does it not restrict admittance to only the best candidates to further its economic agenda, thanks to the points system (as well as other provincial programs aimed at filling employment and skill gaps), whilst natural barriers to illegal immigration do the rest? The underlying motive here is to demystify Canada’s role in “progressive immigration strategies”. The Canadian immigration strategy should more adequately be portrayed as a mix of charitable and economically viable policy rather than erroneously labelling it as one or the other.

A little bit of back story: what do the numbers say?

So, what do we mean by “immigrant”? The term immigrant refers to non-native citizens and non-citizens residing in Canada, excluding temporary foreign workers and those on work or student visas. There are three main classes of immigrants in Canada as defined by Citizenship, Immigration and Refugees Canada: Economic Class, Family Class, and Refugees.

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Note: The 2016 and 2017 figures appear as targets since official numbers have not yet been released for the entire year (only available for the first few quarters).
Source: Immigration data and target data.

Two prominent economists studying migration, Abdurrahman Aydemir and George Borjas, point towards large influxes of “skilled” migration in Canada (mainly due to the points system that favours economic migrants) narrowing the wage inequality gap. They also claim that large influxes of “low-skilled” migrants in the US have had negative labour market impacts, including unemployment and reduced wages. Although their research dates back to 2006, the central policy conclusions remain true today. Canada has seen a steady increase in its admittance of economic class migrants that prioritise Canadian economic welfare over its compassionate international responsibilities towards vulnerable displaced individuals worldwide.

Canada the altruist: the good face of Canadian immigration

As many celebrated the return of the Trudeaumania of the late 1960s, the acceptance of additional thousands of Syrian refugees became one of the cornerstones of the Liberal platform. Between the renaming of Citizenship and Immigration Canada to Citizenship, Immigration and Refugees Canada and the trending #welcomeRefugees Twitter tag, it seemed to usher in a new era of increased appreciation for Canada’s international responsibility. This grand humanitarian gesture towards those in need reaffirmed Canada’s image as a welcoming country, in stark contrast to the rising isolationist, populist and nationalist waves across many western nations.

Although far behind Germany, Canada ranks among the very top regarding inflows of asylum seekers per capita in the world according to OECD estimates. Fulfilling, even surpassing, its international responsibility as per the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Canada has experienced significant growth in its acceptance of permanent residents or immigration numbers, including family reunification through family member sponsoring programs. This increase in diversity puts Canada on the path to nearly one in two residents being either an immigrant or second-generation immigrant (person with at least one parent being an immigrant) by 2036. Although this bright and altruistic depiction of Canadian immigration policy may be inspiring to many, Canadians should remember that the majority of immigration remains economically motivated as opposed to the often-portrayed humanitarian idealism. Refugees and compassionate/humanitarian immigrants remain a small fraction of Canadian immigrants (14.5% per the 2017 immigration target data).

Case against the moral high-horse: nuancing Canada’s altruistic stance

Although it can be flattering to see descriptions of Canada as a compassionate country that is accommodating of migrants of all kinds, one does not need to look far before conceding that such claims need to be nuanced. Despite having become more accommodating over time, the refusal of Jewish migrants and their return to Europe in the wake of the Second World War and rigid ethnic quotas for immigrants (particularly Chinese immigrants before the repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1947 since it was inconsistent with the United Nations Charter of Human Rights) still mar Canada’s historical immigration record.

Canadian immigration, which remains mainly self-interested and economically minded largely depends on the points system to filter out “less-skilled” migrants (although this could potentially include “less-skilled” family members of the primary applicant). These economic migrants serve as important drivers of Canadian entrepreneurship and long-term growth, and it is erroneous to dismiss this as Canadian compassion, selflessness or altruism. Economic migrants offset the costs of other more compassionate forms of immigration such as family reunification or refugees. There also exist natural barriers that prevent these “less-skilled” migrants from crossing into Canada illegally. It is easy to claim that Canada accepts many immigrants on compassionate grounds when it doesn’t have to worry about undocumented migrant waves that are largely “low-skilled” and a potential drain on public resources (at least temporarily) and has economic migrants through the points system that offset costs.

Appreciating Canada’s nuanced stance on immigration: balancing humanitarianism and economic benefit

There exist significant benefits to immigration. These range from higher fertility rate in second-generation immigrants, to maintaining balanced demographics (landed immigrants or first-generation immigrants tend to be older and do not have this rejuvenating effect), to filling employment gaps and reducing inequality, to increasing the average entrepreneurial spirit and increased average education levels. Therefore, immigration can be a boon for Canadian growth. However, we are cherry picking migrants by largely focusing on economic class migrants. And although Canadians have often welcomed asylum seekers and others in need, choosing the cream of the crop when it comes to economic migrants is primarily motivated by economics and demographics, not altruism.

On a global scale, Canada remains among the highest receivers of refugees per capita, with Germany a mile ahead of the pack. Canadians have, to a certain extent, earned the right to claim some moral high ground when it comes to immigration issues. Recent uptakes of family and refugee class permanent residents indicate a more charitable stance to immigration during the Trudeau government’s tenure. But let us all remember that immigration remains a fundamentally economic issue. The recent reductions in targets for refugees (from 55,800 in 2016 to 40,000 in 2017) and the increase in economic immigrants (from 160,600 to 172,500) are a testimony to that.

Canadians from across the political spectrum appear to believe their country is generous in accepting refugees. Canada may be welcoming to refugees and those in need, but claiming its immigration policy is purely selfless is willful ignorance from the “pro-immigration” camp and an easy target for advocates of reduced immigration. There is nothing inherently wrong with a charitable or a self-benefiting (focused on more productive economic migrants) immigration policy, but let it be clear: Canadian immigration policy, as it currently stands, is mainly driven by economic self-interest. We can debate the merits of a philantropic and charitable versus a self-benefiting immigration policy, but let us be clear: Canadian immigration policy, as it currently stands, is mainly driven by economic self-interest.

 

Samuel MacIsaac is a PhD student at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University, where he specializes in International Economic Policy. He holds a Masters in Economics from the University of Montreal. His research interests include international migration, international finance and trade, and international relations. He has written on issues relating to negative interest rates, the impact of trade on education outcomes and forecasts of immigration within Canada.  

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Benefiting from the Conflict in the Korean Peninsula: How China Came Out on Top

By 

OVERVIEW AND HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT

The basis of international affairs surrounding North Korea is the Korean War 1953 armistice. A permanent peace agreement was never enacted, and therefore, all interactions with North Korea continue to be conducted under the auspice of war-time conditions.  Awkwardly, North Korea signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985, and would later agree (1994) to phase out its nuclear capabilities in exchange for international support in development of a civilian nuclear power program.  This dynamic has created conditions for international access to North Korean nuclear programming.

US authorities determined, in 2002, that North Korea maintained a secret nuclear weapons production program and in 2005, an energy crisis in North Korea resulted in the US, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and China agreeing to provide energy aid and ‘economic cooperation’ (i.e. a transfer payment) to North Korea in exchange for the North’s pledge to dismantle all nuclear weapons and facilities.  North Korea accepted the terms of the agreement and promptly violated them by conducting separate ballistic missile and nuclear weapons tests.  This commenced a pattern which can be observed from 2006-2016:  North Korean leaders agree to dismantle its weapons program in exchange for payment; after a period of time an advancement in ballistic missile or nuclear weapons is revealed; additional payment is demanded; and the process starts over.

As of 2017, North Korea claims to have successfully conducted a test of a hydrogen bomb and appears to have advanced long-range missile technology to a point where their weapons may be capable of reaching North America.  Only very recently has China increased pressure on North Korea with a view to nuclear disarmament.  One possible explanation for the late arrival of China in this role is the usefulness of a rogue North Korea vis-à-vis China’s regional military interests.  For example, committing the US Navy to force project against North Korea reduces US capacity to offset expanding Chinese control in the South China Sea.  As such, this dynamic creates a three-way security dilemma worth assessing.

WHAT IS AT STAKE?

Before we launch into the explanation as to why actors are behaving the way they have over the last few months, it is important to identify the objectives of each state. So, what does each player want?

State actor Main objectives

 

United States ·         Avoid loss of critical economic partnerships with Japan and South Korea as regional actors move closer in terms of economic integration

·         Maintain regional military dominance of Chinese containment

·         Maintain regional military dominance of Russian containment

 

China ·         Control over the South China Sea and extending economic waters/zones

·         Maintain military buffer with the United States and avoid Russian-like NATO containment

·         Maintain centralized control of RMB to favour exports and ideally avoid US accusations of currency manipulation

 

North Korea ·         Development of sophisticated military deterrents to preserve the regime militarily

·         For domestic purposes, missile defense has become a cultural cornerstone and serves in preserving/legitimizing the status of the Kim dynasty

·         Status quo: return to the conditions of the armistice agreement, re-instate trade mainly with China and Russia and receive aid from the United States

Although Japan and South Korea are important players in this conflict, because they are not nuclear powers and have played a diminished role in the escalation of the conflict in recent months, they are excluded from this analysis.

MAKING SENSE OF THE CURRENT CONFLICT

In the defense literature, “Security trilemma” – whereby a state, in a complex web of deterrence relationships, may increase its security forces against a belligerent (or perceived as belligerent) state, simply to see a third state feel more insecure. This is the case of North Korea which has alienated its Chinese ally in an effort to develop its nuclear programme and, if its claims are true, reach miniaturization of a nuclear warhead for its long-range weapons. However strict and unfavourable the sanctions may be (and they most definitely are detrimental to the regime), the progression of the regime’s missile and nuclear capabilities seem to have succeeded in galvanizing the domestic population and pushing its military deterrence agenda forward. North Korea succeeds in 2 out of 3 of its objectives.

Although China fears escalation in the Korean conflict, its implementation of economic sanctions against North Korea have set aside previous Sino-American disagreements with regards to accusations of currency manipulation and expansion of territorial waters in the South China Sea. With China able to exert its influence through domestic monetary policy and its expansion in the South China Sea, mild escalations that avoid full fledged warfare have largely benefited the Chinese. Not only have events favoured Chinese foreign and domestic policy, but their alignment with US foreign policy has temporarily camouflaged or immunised them from the ire of Washington that was omnipresent during the last US administration. The recent rapprochement in Sino-American foreign policy may have favoured China, but may endanger longer term relations with North Korea that acts as an important buffer state against American containment. China wins all 3 of its main objectives.

For its part, the US has maintained its spheres of military and economic interests in the region, albeit at the cost of letting China grow its own military might in the South China Sea. Americans have containment directly adjacent to Chinese borders. The American approach is one of incremental pressure on the North Korean regime by forcing the regime to break under pressure. Whether this be an intra-state civil rupture or a North Korea ready to return to the bargaining table with one hand tied behind its back remains unclear. Thus far, the US has largely maintained its objectives in the region but coming short of exerting pressure on China in other matters. The US succeeds in 2 out of 3 of its main objectives.

WHO WINS AND HOW?

In light of the framework set forth, how would each state characterize a victory in this conflict?

China wins: Current conflict distracts from their other objectives elsewhere and avoid going back to the accusations of currency manipulation and influences in the South China Sea of the Obama administration.

US wins: Culmination of North Korean threats never occur dismantling image of nuclear capability and nuclear miniaturization. Possible implosion of the Kim regime under economic and diplomatic pressure.

NK wins: Go back to status quo with only mild tensions enough to justify military and nuclear fixation for the purposes of controlling the domestic population. Ideally, coerce some form of concession from the US whether it be the withdrawal of trade restrictions or a foreign aid payment.

Unfortunately, these “wins” are unlikely or at the very least short-lasting. No single actor will walk away from this conflict unscathed at the expense of other state actors. However, one thing remains certain: war would be catastrophic and detrimental to all, including other surrounding states such as South Korea, Japan and Russia. Compromise will have to be achieved, ideally through diplomatic channels. Although military options remain on the table, these unsavoury options leave much to be desired. With estimates in the millions of casualties within days, every other diplomatic solution should be exhausted before calling upon a forceful intervention. As for the diplomatic solution, time will tell whether the economic pressures on the North Korean regime are enough to bring it to the bargaining table. However, the North Koreans may force an impasse thinking that they could in turn force the Americans back to the bargaining table if nuclear miniaturization is achieved and successfully tested in the eyes of the world. Regardless of the state of the seemingly deadlocked negotiations between the US and North Korea, China’s recent rapprochement to US foreign policy has deflected attention away from previously contested areas in the South China Sea and has temporarily put an end to American accusations of currency manipulation.

 

Samuel MacIsaac is a PhD student at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University, where he specializes in International Economic Policy. He holds a Masters in Economics from the University of Montreal. His research interests include international migration, international finance and trade, and international relations. He has written on issues relating to negative interest rates, the impact of trade on education outcomes and forecasts of immigration within Canada.  

Bryan Bereziuk is a PhD student at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, where he specializes in International Conflict Management and Resolution.  He is an experienced practitioner in counter-insurgency operations and defence organizational development.  His research interests include counter-terrorism policy development, insurgency containment, and international technology transfers. 

Preventing Violent Extremism: NPSIA Student’s Peer-to-Peer Social Media Campaign Goes Viral

By Alex Wilner, Assistant Professor at NPSIA

Combatting violent extremism can involve organizing Peer-to-Peer (P2P) preventing violent extremism (PVE) programs and social media campaigns. While hundreds of PVE campaigns have been launched around the world in recent months and years, very few of these campaigns have actually been reviewed, analyzed, or assessed in any systematic way. Metrics of success and failure have yet to be fully developed, and very little is publically known as to what might differentiate a great and successful P2P campaign from a mediocre one.

NPSIA students are changing that.

In a recently published article in the Journal of Deradicalization (Number 12, Fall 2017) NPSIA students provide a first-hand account of the promises and pitfalls of running a publically funded, university-based, online, peer-to-peer PVE campaign.

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The article, “The 60 Days of PVE Campaign: Lessons on Organizing an Online, Peer-to-Peer, Counter-radicalization Program,” is based on the experience of a group of ten NPSIA students who between January and April 2017, developed and orchestrated an original, English-language PVE campaign as part of the 2017 Facebook Global Digital Challenge. The article provides a detailed account of the group’s approach to PVE and an assessment of its campaign.

The group’s PVE campaign was designed with both short- and long-term initiatives in mind. The first part of the initiative – a social media blitz titled 60 days of PVE (https://www.facebook.com/60DaysOfPVE/) – was developed to run for three months. The data gathered therein, along with the material created during the campaign itself, was simultaneously posted and hosted on another website – www.thePVEproject.com – designed with the intention of establishing a longer-term repository and platform that might assist Carleton University students and groups looking to expand upon the PVE campaign in the future.

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The article highlights the entirety of the group’s campaign, from theory and conceptualization to branding, media strategy, and evaluation, and describes the campaign’s core objectives and implementation. The article also analyzes the campaign’s digital footprint and reach using data gleamed from social media.

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Finally, the article discusses the challenges and difficulties the group faced in running their campaign, lessons that are pertinent for others contemplating a similar endeavour.

 

Free access to the article is available here: http://journals.sfu.ca/jd/index.php/jd/article/view/117/97

 

 

 

What Do We Know About the Kurdish Referendum

by Stephen M. Saideman

Not much as I haven’t studied the Kurds.  McGill Phd David Romano has studied them a great deal, and there are others who are far more expert.  However, I do know something about separatism, referenda and irredentism, so here’s what I think:

  1. Separatism is not as contagious as advertised. The only folks who really get encouraged by an effort, successful or otherwise, are those who are kin.  Everyone else is far more focused on their own incentives and constraints.  They will learn from the examples elsewhere whatever lessons that support their pre-existing inclinations.  Yes, I was a fan of confirmation bias long before it was cool.
  2. The Sunnis will not be pleased.  It is hard enough for two smaller groups to attempt to balance the Shia in whatever semi-democratic institutions, but with Kurds leaving, Sunnis are dwarfed by Shia.  Hard to craft a democracy or anything else that gives Sunnis some chance of not being dominated.  So, yeah, Kurds leaving would screw Sunnis just as Slovenia screwed the Bosnians.  Everything old is new again.
  3. Irredentism is not in the cards.  Sure, one could talk about a Greater Kurdistan, but which Kurds get to rule it?  Milton (and Khan) was right: better to reign in hell than serve in heaven.  So, no, despite what Turkey might say, there will be no significant effort at Greater Kurdistan.
  4. I am not a fan of secession from advanced democracies–the costs of changing are too high and always underplayed by the secessionists, democracy depends on losers staying in the system, and usually there are ways to get what you need, if not what you want.  But the Kurds have some reasonable grievances, starting with how they can’t trust the Shia dominated government of Iraq.
  5. The timing makes sense–Kurdish strength is at an alltime high given that the US, Canada and others have armed and trained the Kurds.  Those efforts are already declining now that ISIS has been mostly removed from the Kurds’ neighborhood.  Iraq is still weak due to the ongoing war with ISIS, so now makes sense….
  6. But a referendum does not mean independence.  It can mean a process, a bargaining process that can take quite some time.  The question of violence really now depends on what the Iraqi government will do.  Governments generally don’t let secessionist regions leave–lots of work on this especially by Monica Toft.
  7. Countries will support whichever side they have ethnic ties (article version).  If no ties, then other interests, such as seeking stability will kick in.  The one thing, for damn sure, is that countries will not be deterred by their own vulnerability to separatism.
  8. Turkey will overreact.  Duh.

What does it mean for the war against ISIS?  Damned if I know.  Anyhow, my past work suggests this will be both better and worse than what the pundits say.  Woot?

Jez Littlewood on Bill C-59 and what it means for Canada’s national security

The recently introduced Bill C-59 described by experts as the biggest overhaul in Canadian national security since the creation of the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS) in 1984, enacts the establishment of a so-called super watchdog agency – the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency – to keep an eye on federal departments and agencies gathering intelligence, as well as revamps the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) and its activities, among other provisions. Katarina Koleva talked to Jez Littlewood, an Assistant Professor at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, who teaches courses on terrorism, national security, intelligence, and arms control, about his thoughts on Bill C-59, the changes it introduces, and what they mean for Canada’s security.

iAffairs: What exactly is Bill C-59 going to change?

Jez Littlewood: The Bill is going to change a lot of things. It is omnibus legislation. It changes a number of existing acts of legislation such as the CSIS’s Act, the National Defence Act, it changes parts of what was the antiterrorism act in 2015 – Bill C 51. In that sense, it changes a lot in terms of accountability structures but equally, in reality, it is tweaking and refining some of the major issues that were clearly points of concern among parliamentarians as well as among the public in Bill C-51 rather than rejecting them and getting rid of them in their entirety.

iAffairs: In what way does Bill C-59 address and refine some of the concerns raised by Bill C-51?

Jez Littlewood: It tries to do this in two ways. The first is to refine or amend some definitional terms in certain areas. To give two examples in that sense. First, major concerns were raised about the idea that CSIS could take part in what are considered to be disruption activities. This makes CSIS, rather than a passive gatherer of intelligence that was passed on to other people, if there was a threat to the security of Canada, more actively involved in disrupting those threats. C-51 allowed or certainly permitted that those disruption activities could be potentially very far ranging, to the point that it allowed breaches of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, in certain circumstances, if a federal judge approved a warrant for such activities in contravention of the Charter. In one sense, a major concern was that we were allowing our intelligence agency to essentially violate certain portions of the Charter, under federal warrant, but that warrant itself will be delivered in secret. Bill C-59 rolls that back by essentially making it clear that there are certain disruption activities which do not require a warrant even though these are not specified in the Act. Listed in the Act in seven broad categories of disruption where a warrant would be required. These are the areas of potential concern.  Equally, it is clear that C-59 passes what the lawyers would call the Section One Charter test, which means it is supposed to be within the infringement of civil liberties and rights the Charter permits for national security reasons. That is one area.

Another area relates to disclosure of information and what was the Information Sharing Act. The concerns in the Bill C-51, in that context, was that 17 agencies and departments in Canada were named in the act itself as being able to share information, if perceived to be necessary to assist in the security of Canada. That, “security of Canada,” was a very broad definition. This has been narrowed somewhat, in an attempt to clarify that we are not talking about new intelligence collection, and that such sharing of information can only happen if it really does assist in national security investigation. So, there is some tweaking of the definitions in C-51 and refinements to certain portions of it rather than a wholesale rolling back.

iAffairs: What would be the mandate and the structure of the new super watchdog agency and how would it fit within the existing bodies of ministerial, judicial, and independent oversight?

Jez Littlewood: Essentially, the new agency deals with a problem that we’ve long had in existence in Canada. At this stage, the intelligence accountability is based upon review bodies that are sort of agency or department specific. For example CSIS had the Security Intelligence Review Committee and it could only look at CSIS; CSE has the Office of the CSE Commissioner; the RCMP has the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission. The barriers between these review bodies, the silos, have been quite firm, not impossible to bridge, but nonetheless still quite firm. This new review agency – the National Security Intelligence Review Agency – is going to subsume and take over certainly SIRC and the CSE Commissioner’s office. It will take some responsibilities for the national security component of the RCMPS’s review body in a way that allows review and accountability agencies to follow the thread of the investigations, as people say, rather than be siloed. We are likely to see, assuming C-59 passes in due course, a fundamental restructuring of Canadian intelligence and accountability oversight issues. This is, of course, in conjunction with two other areas. The first is the establishment of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians which gives parliamentarians a role here, which is separate to what is in C-59. But equally we would see in C-59 itself the creation of an Intelligence Commissioner who will handle some of the ministerial authorizations so that the instructions and permissions from the ministers to CSE, within its foreign intelligence and cyber role, and within CSIS related to the retention of its open source datasets.

iAffairs: How would the new review Agency and the Parliamentarian Committee complement each other?

Jez Littlewood: They are separate or will be separate in law. But certainly within the first drafting of C-59 it is clear that the new review agency will work with parliamentarians, if they decide or they have a common interest. They can certainly share or would be expected to share information where it is possible to do so. So, we should see these bodies as separate but nevertheless complementary. I certainly don’t detect in the way the legislation is written that these are competing rather than complementary, in different levels. There is a level of interest and focus within parliamentarians and a different level of experts working inside and along with an agency, department, or entity which is doing intelligence. In reality, the latter is not what you would expect parliamentarians to be doing anyway. But the overlap exists and Parliamentarians have a quite wide latitude on paper to go where they see fit.

iAffairs: Do you see any weaknesses in the text of Bill C-59?

Jez Littlewood: There are a number of issues which have to be thought about, in some detail, and presumably discussed quite robustly in parliamentary committees. It is clear that some organizations remain concerned about the level of information sharing. The information sharing components of C-51 have now been renamed the information disclosure components of C-59. There are also some issues in terms of the tweaking of the passenger protect program, i.e. the no fly list, which remains a concern for some civil liberties organizations. So I would certainly expect the government is going to be pushed quite hard in consultations, and don’t necessarily think we should expect this to be simple or easy ride, in terms of the passage of Bill C-59 in due course.

iAffairs: When is the bill likely to become law? How long will the process take?

Jez Littlewood: I would imagine it will take at least one year. There is an expectation that there will be further delay. So, even if we allow for parliamentary committees to be up and running, and considering this in October, it is a wide ranging bill, with a lot of moving parts. If it is going to be reviewed correctly, that is going to take, in my view, at least six to eight months of committee hearings, and back and forth. I would be surprised if C-59 is law by this time next year, in 2018. At the same time, I would be somewhat disappointed given the fact that I am broadly in favor of what is in C-59. There are some things that might need attention but I will be somewhat disappointed if it wasn’t finally tweaked and becomes acceptable by the end of 2018.

iAffairs: The document permits CSE to hack foreign nations. Is it aimed to shut down potential cyber-attacks?

Jez Littlewood: The CSE already has foreign and signal intelligence, as well as cyber safety and cyber assurance role. It is in its existing mandate, as well as offering technical advice to existing law enforcement intelligence agencies. It is really putting armour or proposing to put on a legal footing the fact that CSE can have more interventionist role, more active or offensive role. But equally it can have an active defensive role in thwarting attacks and interfering with the structures in the cyber domain. At this early stage, we understand, these will not be decisions taken solely by the CSE internally. Such decisions would have to involve ministerial authorizations and oversight of a fairly high level of government. So, it alters CSE mandate pretty much in line with what people have been thinking is going to be necessary in the future years, and puts more extensive and intrusive technical capabilities in the hands of government on a much more formal legal foundation.

iAffairs: Are there models of super watchdog agencies, in other countries, that Canada can draw examples from?

Jez Littlewood: The one, in some sense of a model, might be Australia which has the Inspector General approach which looks across all of Australia’s national security and intelligence community. In some respects we can look at that. In another way, in a separate environment, we can look at the UK’s Independent Commissioner to deal with counterterrorism issues which is focused on counterterrorism, not the broader set of national security. Canada’s approach is to cover all aspects of national security.

iAffairs: What are your thoughts with regard to the latest terrorist attacks in London and elsewhere – using vehicles as weapons?

Jez Littlewood: It is not a new terror tactic in the sense that we’ve seen vehicles used as weapons in Nice, France, in Germany, in Sweden, and elsewhere. However, it has been an innovation over the last decade or so, a part of a broader trend with two characteristics. The first is coming exclusively from the so-called Islamic State for individuals to basically carry out acts of terror wherever and however they can. Even if you do not have access to bombs or weapons, you use what you have and this is what we see in the propaganda, as well as in the literature – use a vehicle, use a knife. A good example, of course, being October 2014, and the attack in Quebec. The other part of that trend is that counterterrorism efforts have made it more difficult, but not impossible, for individuals to get quite sophisticated weapons. So, in one sense the success of counterterrorism in largely removing bomb making capabilities has pushed terrorists into using bladed weapons, vehicles etc. This trend reinforces what we’ve known for a long time throughout the history of terrorism – terrorism and counterterrorism have action-reaction effect on each other. If some things become harder or more difficult for terrorists, they shift to different kinds of targeting tactics. This, unfortunately, is one of those realities we are all living in.

In terms of prevention, are we going to harden every bridge, every sidewalk? That is unlikely. That is not really going to happen. Some measures might be temporary, in terms of, for example, if you have a special event where the street is closed off for a public celebration. The streets around it, you may have a much more controlled access to a given area. There are some practical short term measures that can be taken. But the reality is it is very difficult for any intelligence agency or police force to prevent an individual who may simply get in his own car and decide to target civilians. It is an unfortunate reality. We have to accept that we can do some things but we cannot eliminate all risks in their entirety.

This article is a cross-post from iAffairs.

Nuclear Logics: Uncertainty Is Not Necessarily Bad

by Stephen M. Saideman

Reading Andrew Coyne’s piece on North Korea and the need for Canada to join the American Ballistic Missile Defence System reminded me of lots of old deterrence theory stuff.  The piece raises good questions about the reliability of the key actors, especially Trump, but confuses what is necessary for deterrence.  Still, there are some problems that we need to think about.

The big problem in the piece is that Coyne thinks that the American commitment to defend its East Asia allies is now largely unbelievable with the North Koreans developing the ability to strike the continental US (and Canada).  It is true that the US, under several Presidents, has failed to deter the North Korean effort to develop both nuclear weapons and the missiles to deliver them.  But deterring their effort to develop some deterrence and deterring an attack on allies are two different things.  Coyne is right to point out that extended deterrence (don’t attack my allies or else) is less believable than regular, vanilla deterrence (don’t attack me or else).  The threat to start or expand a nuclear war is problematic in either case, but seems a bit more believable if it is in retaliation for a big attack on the homeland.

The key is that for deterrence to work, the side being deterred (North Korea in this case for the moment) does not need to be certain that a counter-strike would happen.  They just need to think that there is some possibility of such a response.  Why?  Because the costs of nuclear war are so very high, if one does the probability math (probability of x times value of x), the prospective costs of attacking first are simply too high compared to the status quo (.01 times infinity = infinity) …. as long as the status quo is bearable (which is why we have to stop threatening regime change).  We do not have to convince North Korea that a retaliatory strike is certain if North Korea attacks South Korea and/or Japan, but that it could happen.  The placement of US troops in South Korea is far more about being a tripwire to raise the probability of the US responding than actually defending South Korea in a conventional attack.

Again, one might say that this is not sufficient, but the key to nuclear threats is that classic Schelling phrase: a threat that leaves something to chance.  One does not have to threaten, for instance, total nuclear annihilation of North Korea crosses the Demilitarized Zone–one just has to threat to start a process that might lead to things getting out of hand and ultimately leading to nuclear war.  This was the old extended deterrence logic for Europe and Asia during the cold war.

Certainty?  That is for allies.  That is, the tripwires and all the rest over the years are mostly aimed at reassuring allies.  The enemy is deterred by a modest chance of the US responding, of sacrificing Chicago for Bonn or now Seattle for Seoul.  The allies?  They are very nervous and require a great deal of assurance.  Ballistic missile defense both in the region and in the US might assure them somewhat–that the US can stick around and meet its commitments knowing that it is protected.

Except for one thing: BMD may be at best a coin flip.  We have lots of uncertainty about whether the efforts to invest in destroying missiles in flight have produced anything remotely reliable.  Again, that is ok from a deterrence perspective–uncertainty is not bad.

While I think that joining the US BMD program makes sense, my reasons do not center on the NK nuclear threat.  The US would try to stop an attack on Vancouver or Toronto since they are very close to American cities whether Canada is in or out of the BMD program.  And North Korea is not going to be gunning for Calgary or Edmonton.  North Korea barely notices Canada, and, given its small supply of nuclear arms, it will not be aiming at Canada.  The BMD arguments I buy have more to do with building a robust NORAD that addresses a variety of threats in the 21st century, and strengthening a key US-Canadian institution in these uncertain times.

While we should all doubt Donald Trump, I am far more worried about his starting a process that leaves something to chance via a small strike at North Korea’s missiles or at its leadership than I am about his not responding to a North Korean attack.  Yes, we are now deterred from attacking North Korea, but that has been true since it developed the capability level Seoul with its artillery.  Yes, we have much to worry about, but then so does Kim Jong Un.  If he wants to survive, he will avoid a process that might lead to escalation.  The costs of being wrong are just too high.

Old Deterrence Logics Still Apply

by Stephen M. Saideman

Reading Andrew Coyne’s piece on North Korea and the need for Canada to join the American Ballistic Missile Defence System reminded me of lots of old deterrence theory stuff.  The piece raises good questions about the reliability of the key actors, especially Trump, but confuses what is necessary for deterrence.  Still, there are some problems that we need to think about.

The big problem in the piece is that Coyne thinks that the American commitment to defend its East Asia allies is now largely unbelievable with the North Koreans developing the ability to strike the continental US (and Canada).  It is true that the US, under several Presidents, has failed to deter the North Korean effort to develop both nuclear weapons and the missiles to deliver them.  But deterring their effort to develop some deterrence and deterring an attack on allies are two different things.  Coyne is right to point out that extended deterrence (don’t attack my allies or else) is less believable than regular, vanilla deterrence (don’t attack me or else).  The threat to start or expand a nuclear war is problematic in either case, but seems a bit more believable if it is in retaliation for a big attack on the homeland.

The key is that for deterrence to work, the side being deterred (North Korea in this case for the moment) does not need to be certain that a counter-strike would happen.  They just need to think that there is some possibility of such a response.  Why?  Because the costs of nuclear war are so very high, if one does the probability math (probability of x times value of x), the prospective costs of attacking first are simply too high compared to the status quo (.01 times infinity = infinity) …. as long as the status quo is bearable (which is why we have to stop threatening regime change).  We do not have to convince North Korea that a retaliatory strike is certain if North Korea attacks South Korea and/or Japan, but that it could happen.  The placement of US troops in South Korea is far more about being a tripwire to raise the probability of the US responding than actually defending South Korea in a conventional attack.

Again, one might say that this is not sufficient, but the key to nuclear threats is that classic Schelling phrase: a threat that leaves something to chance.  One does not have to threaten, for instance, total nuclear annihilation of North Korea crosses the Demilitarized Zone–one just has to threat to start a process that might lead to things getting out of hand and ultimately leading to nuclear war.  This was the old extended deterrence logic for Europe and Asia during the cold war.

Certainty?  That is for allies.  That is, the tripwires and all the rest over the years are mostly aimed at reassuring allies.  The enemy is deterred by a modest chance of the US responding, of sacrificing Chicago for Bonn or now Seattle for Seoul.  The allies?  They are very nervous and require a great deal of assurance.  Ballistic missile defense both in the region and in the US might assure them somewhat–that the US can stick around and meet its commitments knowing that it is protected.

Except for one thing: BMD may be at best a coin flip.  We have lots of uncertainty about whether the efforts to invest in destroying missiles in flight have produced anything remotely reliable.  Again, that is ok from a deterrence perspective–uncertainty is not bad.

While I think that joining the US BMD program makes sense, my reasons do not center on the NK nuclear threat.  The US would try to stop an attack on Vancouver or Toronto since they are very close to American cities whether Canada is in or out of the BMD program.  And North Korea is not going to be gunning for Calgary or Edmonton.  North Korea barely notices Canada, and, given its small supply of nuclear arms, it will not be aiming at Canada.  The BMD arguments I buy have more to do with building a robust NORAD that addresses a variety of threats in the 21st century, and strengthening a key US-Canadian institution in these uncertain times.

While we should all doubt Donald Trump, I am far more worried about his starting a process that leaves something to chance via a small strike at North Korea’s missiles or at its leadership than I am about his not responding to a North Korean attack.  Yes, we are now deterred from attacking North Korea, but that has been true since it developed the capability level Seoul with its artillery.  Yes, we have much to worry about, but then so does Kim Jong Un.  If he wants to survive, he will avoid a process that might lead to escalation.  The costs of being wrong are just too high.