One of the most influential books in the realm of international security is Thomas Schelling’s Strategy of Conflict. It certainly was one of my favorite books in grad school, and I have been relying on key concepts in it and in his subsequent work ever since.*
* Key caveat here is that I have not read it lately and don’t have the time to re-read it right now. So I hope I am remembering things right.
The fundamental idea is: “the power to hurt is the power to bargain.” With the advent of air power, countries could punish each other without having to win a conventional war on the ground. This facilitates coercive diplomacy–the threat or use of force to persuade the other side to do what you want them to do. This is, of course, very relevant right now as the U.S. has been attempting to engage in coercive diplomacy with Assad’s regime in Syria. The red line stuff really fit the stuff that Schelling talks about–raising the stakes, making clear commitments, and so on. But deterrence did not work. Oops.
This is not the first time that coercive diplomacy has not worked out as intended. Indeed, in the 1970s and 1980s, there was a heap of literature on deterrence failure (George and Smoke, a special issue of World Politics, and on and on). Vietnam could be seen as the first failure of coercive diplomacy as the graduated escalation was supposed to persuade the North Vietnamese to back down. In more recent times, the 1991 war with Iraq was a failure in the sense that force had to be used to evict Saddam Hussein’s forces from Kuwait, when he should have retreated once the U.S. had 500k troops on the ground. 2003? Not so much, as the US had no intention of bargaining with Hussein. Libya? Not really an attempt to bargain, as the use of force was aimed to stop his forces and then give the rebels enough support to overthrow him. But these days, with Syria, it is very much coercive diplomacy.
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