By Valerie Percival
The Syrian crisis is no longer contained. Millions of refugees have fled into neighbouring countries. Tens of thousands are walking miles across Europe in search of safety and compassion. Yet the world seems paralyzed – incapable of a coordinated response.
Canada shares in that paralysis. The recent announcement from the government recognizing Syrians as “prima facie” refugees, appointing a senior coordinator and scaling up immigration staff is welcome. Yet the government changed its policies begrudgingly, with a cap of just 10,000 refugees by the end of the year and 46,000 by 2019. Their talking points remain constant, reminding Canadians that an influx of tens of thousands of refugees from Syria could undermine Canada’s security and way of life.
Such a parochial approach is inconsistent with the facts. Canada is a rich country. We are also a nation of migrants. Refugees fleeing war and oppression have long contributed to Canada’s material wealth, social capital and promise. And Canada’s security has always been best served by extending a hand to those in need.
By Jean Daudelin
In an enthusiastic endorsement of Barrack Obama’s new offensive in Syria, Brookings’ Kenneth Pollack argues that the key to the stability of the region lies in effective nation-building.
In the face of innumerable failures and, over the last 20 years, of the progressive reconfiguration of Germany, Central Europe and the Balkans around newly created — or re-created — ethnic states, Pollack still argues that multi-ethnic or multi-communal nation-building is possible in the Middle-East, from the outside and without rearranging the absurd boundaries of the region.
And yet, if it were successful (a big if), the most likely outcome of the strategy he outlines — arming a “moderate” Syrian opposition and helping it take control of the country against both Assad and IS — would be the rise to power, in Syria, of a Sunni regime that would be a mirror image of Iraq’s Shia one, and under which you wouldn’t want to be a minority: Alawite, Kurdish or Christian, in this case, instead of Kurdish and Sunni in Iraq.
As originally posted by The Globe and Mail.
By Steve Saideman
There are many good reasons why President Barack Obama has been reluctant to get the U.S. directly involved in Syria’s civil war. The U.S. has already fought a number of wars and lesser conflicts in the Mideast since the terror attacks of September 11, with none leading to a satisfying outcome. This has exhausted the American armed forces, tested the patience of the American people, and cost trillions of dollars that can never be recouped. Until recently, public opinion was against any more conflict in or near Syria. Congress, too, has given Mr. Obama yet more reason to avoid involvement in Syria. The Republicans would prefer not to give him authority to act while complaining that the President is too weak and lacking leadership.
Leaving aside the complex domestic constraints, Mr. Obama faces a very serious problem in Syria: who to support? By fighting the Islamic State, Mr. Obama may end up supporting the Assad Regime. This is similar to the problem in Iraq, where helping Iraq might mean helping Iran. At least in Iraq there are two elements that the U.S. can support with only some qualms. The Kurds have a somewhat competent force, and they have done nearly all of the right things to suggest that they have popular support and, most important, are unlikely to turn their guns against the Americans. The government of Iraq could be an ally of the U.S. in this, especially since its interests are more directly implicated. The problem has been that the Shia-dominated government has broken the various agreements the U.S. had made with the Sunnis during the so-called Anbar Awakening. That movement was as – or more – essential to the decline in violence as the American surge.
One of the most influential books in the realm of international security is Thomas Schelling’s Strategy of Conflict. It certainly was one of my favorite books in grad school, and I have been relying on key concepts in it and in his subsequent work ever since.*
* Key caveat here is that I have not read it lately and don’t have the time to re-read it right now. So I hope I am remembering things right.
The fundamental idea is: “the power to hurt is the power to bargain.” With the advent of air power, countries could punish each other without having to win a conventional war on the ground. This facilitates coercive diplomacy–the threat or use of force to persuade the other side to do what you want them to do. This is, of course, very relevant right now as the U.S. has been attempting to engage in coercive diplomacy with Assad’s regime in Syria. The red line stuff really fit the stuff that Schelling talks about–raising the stakes, making clear commitments, and so on. But deterrence did not work. Oops.
This is not the first time that coercive diplomacy has not worked out as intended. Indeed, in the 1970s and 1980s, there was a heap of literature on deterrence failure (George and Smoke, a special issue of World Politics, and on and on). Vietnam could be seen as the first failure of coercive diplomacy as the graduated escalation was supposed to persuade the North Vietnamese to back down. In more recent times, the 1991 war with Iraq was a failure in the sense that force had to be used to evict Saddam Hussein’s forces from Kuwait, when he should have retreated once the U.S. had 500k troops on the ground. 2003? Not so much, as the US had no intention of bargaining with Hussein. Libya? Not really an attempt to bargain, as the use of force was aimed to stop his forces and then give the rebels enough support to overthrow him. But these days, with Syria, it is very much coercive diplomacy.
When I used to teach introduction to international relations classes, I would tell my students that I hoped they would be more confused at the end of the term than at the beginning. I told them I would be providing multiple perspectives on how to look at international relations and it would be up to them to figure out which ones make sense at any given time for any given topic.
So, perhaps it is fitting that I am seriously confused about the latest moves regarding Syria. No, not the Canadian ones. That Prime Minister Stephen Harper and Foreign Minister John Baird have issued statements siding strongly with the U.S. but committing to not committing the Canadian Forces to the effort does not surprise me. That much was pretty predictable.
The confusing developments have been in Great Britain and the United States. Prime Minister David Cameron lost a huge vote to gain parliament’s support for a Syrian mission. While it is not surprising that his coalition partner, the Liberal Democrats, might not be as enthusiastic as the Tories, the fact that Cameron lost the support of a key chunk of his own party was very surprising. This is one of the biggest failures of vote counting prior to an important vote that I can remember. Yes, there are a lot of raw feelings left over from the Iraq War, but one of the key rules for democratic leaders is not to hold votes until one knows what the outcome is going to be.
No, not me, but the former military head of the alliance, James Stavridis. I am a big fan of Stavridis, and was so before he provided such an excellent blurb for the Dave and Steve book. I was not sure how I would take his piece on Syria, as I am skeptical about getting NATO together on this one (as well as skeptical about what force will accomplish).
His basic point is that NATO never really shows up entirely–every NATO war is a coalition of the willing, as countries vary in what they contribution. This time the constellation is different. Sure, but losing the UK is huge. Germany may have heaps of capabilities, but we are used to the Germans opting out entirely or opting in with significant restrictions. The British have always been an enthusiastic participant and have capabilities that other NATO countries do not possess, such as Tomahawk cruise missiles (which only the US also has).
The other problem with the piece is that he knows only too well as former SACEUR but cannot say it out loud a key piece of NATO truth: a threat to Turkey (Syria) is not the same as a threat to Italy or France (Libya). Turkey has much less sway in the alliance, and a few countries have a fair amount of hostility towards Turkey. So, don’t expect NATO consensus to form over the defense of Turkey. At least, not easily and not quickly.