The Salvadorian Truce One Year Later: a Divisive Strategy

In March 2012, the two most prominent Salvadorian gangs, the Maras Salvatrucha and the Barrio 18, concluded a cease-fire in the greatest secrecy. After years of fighting and extreme violence between them, the two gangs reached a secret accord to stop the constant massacre that broke so many families and communities. Following the conclusion of the truce, the number of homicides dropped by 41%, from 4,371 in 2011 to 2,576 in 2012, according to the National Civil Police (PNC)[1]. This change was unhoped-for in the country that presented the highest homicide rate on average in the region for the last decade. In a country of a little more than 6 million in population, the number of gang members is estimated at approximately 60,000. Therefore, change in the behaviours of gangs and their members may certainly affect the crime and victimization portrait of the country.

The truce was initially negotiated by the Monsignor Fabio Colindres, head chaplain of the Salvadorian military and police, and the ex-congressman Raul Mijango. The Funes administration, the first government directed by the Frente Farabundo Martí de Liberación Nacional since the end of the civil war in 1992, claimed at first that it was not involved in any ways in the negotiation of the truce. For its part, the Catholic Church distanced itself from the role played by the Bishop Colindres, illustrating the profound division within the institution.

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